Tony Makin
V n the late 1980s, monetary policy aggressively targeted the current-account I deficit (CAD) which was then officially interpreted as the gap between national -A-output and national expenditure and as the major macroeconomic constraint on the Australian economy. As a result, short-term interest rates peaked at over 18 per cent in mid-1989; and the subsequent recession saw unemployment rise to 11 per cent, the highest level in decades and well above the OECD average of 7 per cent. The economy suffered far more than it would have if monetary policy had remained neutral, or had itself been constrained by some monetary rule.
The policy reaction occurred despite 'New View' arguments circulating at the time about the changed significance of the external account 'imbalance' under a floating exchange rate and deregulated international financial markets (Makin 1988 (Makin , 1989 Pitchford 1990; Corden 1991) . Among other things, the New View stresses that external imbalances are the difference between domestic saving and investment, to the extent that they reflect private-sector decisions, are no cause for policy con cern.
Now that the economy is recovering, we need to remind ourselves that the CAD itself is not really a constraint and that using monetary policy to reduce the CAD probably would not work in any case.
The Exchange Rate and External Adjustment
Under the present floating exchange-rate system, CADs and capital inflow over any period will, in principle, always be equal ex post Yet most analysts still interpret CADs as 'bad', forgetting that the matching capital-account surpluses are 'good' to the extent that they usually finance extra private investment. As shown empirically in Makin (1993 Makin ( , 1994 and Layton and Makin (1993) , extra foreign finance and in vestment of die 1980s actually made Australia better off in terms of its GDP and wealdi to the extent that die value of the capital stock was larger than otherwise. Wealdi per head, for instance, rose by over a diird in the 1980s.
If at any time die two sides of the external accounts do not match ex ante, the nominal exchange rate moves to ensure they do. So concern about the balance of payments 'constraint' makes no sense unless die exchange rate itself goes into free fall. But this would happen only in the event that foreigners at once, and en masse, changed dieir minds about financing any of die addidonal private investment ac companying higher growdi levels. This is unlikely; and it would not, as such, amount to a balance of payments 'crisis' for die audiorides, but rather an exchangerate management issue that may not require a heavy handed policy response. If there were a sudden flight of foreign capital that precipitated a sharp exchange-rate depreciation, foreigners would be dumping debt instruments on the domestic mar ket and at the same time forcing down their prices. Not only would part of the stock of Australia's foreign debt vanish, but lower financial asset prices would raise yields in domestic financial markets. At some point, the higher returns on domestic instruments would attract foreign investors back into the Australian market, so placing a natural floor under the exchange rate. Additionally, a sharp depreciation would raise export values and, over time, improved competitiveness would discour age imports. In general, as David Hume (1752) argued, external disturbances tend to be self-equilibrating.
Do High Interest Rates Reduce the CAD Anyway?
Whether tighter monetary policy actually reduces the CAD is a largely unresolved theoretical issue. The popular Mundell-Fleming approach, favoured for instance by Bewley and White (1990) , suggests that tighter monetary policy widens the CAD because higher interest rates cause a higher real exchange rate, which discourages net exports. In odier words, monetary tightening could deliver the opposite exter nal account outcome to that intended.
However, this approach ignores certain key linkages between monetary policy and die CAD. For instance, higher interest rates also suppress national expendi ture, which lowers imports and possibly raises exports (to the extent that less spending by residents means a greater share of domestic output becomes available for sale abroad). This would tend to narrow the CAD, offsetting the exchange ratetrade account linkage of the Mundell-Fleming model.
Yet the biggest component of the CAD is not the difference between exports and imports of goods and services, but net interest paid abroad on foreign debt, over half of which is denominated in foreign currency. The Australian dollar value of such interest shrinks when the exchange rate appreciates, thus reducing the CAD. But then higher domestic interest rates also raise the amount of interest paid to foreign holders of domestic bonds denominated in Australian currency, thus Non-Agenda 127 raising income paid abroad as debited in the current account. On balance, there fore, the effect of monetary tightening on the CAD is ambiguous.
Conclusion
In view of Australia's macroeconomic performance since the late 1980s, a repeat discretionary tightening of monetary conditions in response to a perceived currentaccount constraint would amount to policy recidivism on the part of the authorities. Not only could such action reverse recovery and lead to high unemployment, it would again reveal a fundamental misunderstanding of how the external balance is generated and, moreover, would be unlikely to reduce the CAD.
On the other hand, a current-account objective could in theory be assigned to fiscal policy. Lower budget deficits may reduce the external deficit to the extent that higher public saving lifts total national saving relative to national investment. Unfor tunately, there is then the risk that if foreigners enthusiastically endorse such fiscal restraint by investing more of their funds in Australia, the additional inflow of for eign money would increase the capital-account surplus and thereby reverse any fis cally induced 'improvement' in the CAD!
